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AMICI CURIAE’S STATEMENT OF INTEREST AND OVERVIEW1 
 Amici are the children of Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru 
Yasui, three American citizens of Japanese ancestry who, as young men during 
World War II, challenged the constitutionality of the military orders subjecting 
Japanese Americans to curfew and forced removal from the West Coast. Deferring 
to the government’s claim of military necessity, and failing to scrutinize the basis 
for the government’s actions, the Supreme Court affirmed their criminal 
convictions for defying the military orders, placing its stamp of approval on one of 
the most sweeping deprivations of constitutional liberties in recent American 
history. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943). 
 Forty years later, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui successfully reopened 
their cases and had their wartime convictions vacated, based on proof that in order 
to secure favorable decisions from the Supreme Court, the government had 
suppressed, altered, and destroyed military and civilian intelligence directly 
refuting its claim that military necessity justified the wartime internment of 
Japanese Americans. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406 (N.D.Cal. 
1984); Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987), affirming in 
part and reversing in part, 627 F.Supp. 1445 (W.D.Wash. 1986); Order, Yasui v. 
                                                 
1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Only amici’s counsel authored, or 
contributed money for the preparation and submission of, this brief. FRAP 29(c)(5). 
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United States, Crim. No. C 16056, at 2 (D.Or. Jan. 26, 1984) (granting 
government’s motion to vacate conviction and dismissing petition), rev’d and 
remanded on other grounds, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985). These men showed 
that the internment was far more than an unfortunate “mistake,” as many had 
concluded, but was the product of a fundamental and pervasive abuse of power.   
The federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, failed to accord the 
internment of Japanese Americans the exacting scrutiny the government’s 
wholesale deprivation of constitutional liberties demanded. Had it done so, the lack 
of bona fide factual justification for the internment–as well as the government’s 
fraud on the courts, the Japanese American community, and the nation–would 
likely have been revealed. The NDAA’s indefinite detention scheme echoes the 
indefinite detention that characterized the internment, and, similarly, it is factually 
unsubstantiated as well as ill-defined and overbroad in scope, as Judge Forrest 
found.  
 The threshold issue here is whether this Court will exactingly review the 
government’s legal and factual defense of the NDAA’s indefinite detention 
provision, as Judge Forrest did, or will instead uncritically defer to the 
government’s position, as the Court did in the internment cases. Given the 
constitutional liberties at stake here, and in the spirit of their fathers’ defenses of 
those same freedoms, amici urge this Court to draw upon the revelations of the 
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Japanese American internment and coram nobis cases and affirm Judge Forrest’s 
application of heightened scrutiny to her review of the NDAA’s indefinite 
detention provisions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME OF CHECKS AND BALANCES 
COMPELS CAREFUL JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF GOVERNMENT 
NATIONAL SECURITY RESTRICTIONS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES. 
 
In the shadow of America’s expansive war on terror, disagreement persists 
about the judiciary’s role in reviewing legal challenges to government national 
security actions curtailing fundamental liberties. Some, including former Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, contend the judiciary should play a muted role, 
explaining “[t]he laws will...not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a 
somewhat different voice.” William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil 
Liberties in Wartime 224-25 (2000); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (the judiciary “has shown great deference to the political branches when 
called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of…national security”), 
vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Because the government usually can articulate a 
facially plausible national security rationale for its actions, this limited approach 
inevitably aligns the courts with the political branches even in the face of 
government excesses or unsubstantiated claims of necessity. 
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 This deferential approach conflicts with the constitutionally enshrined 
principle of government accountability through checks-and-balances. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, careful judicial scrutiny of constitutionally 
questionable actions of the political branches is essential to securing the nation as a 
democracy. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); Ex parte Milligan, 71 
U.S. 2, 14 (1866) (rejecting government’s argument that the President has wartime 
power to serve as “supreme legislator, supreme judge, and supreme executive”); 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008) (“To hold that the political 
branches may switch the Constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime in 
which they, not this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”). When the judiciary fails to 
discharge its constitutional obligation to check the political branches, as in the 
WWII internment cases, democracy’s rule of law is threatened. Eric K. Yamamoto, 
White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President 
Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 285, 327 
(2005).  
 The judiciary’s independent check on the executive and legislative branches 
is most important during times of national distress. It is then that the political 
branches have too often sacrificed constitutional liberties in the name of national 
security, scapegoating innocent individuals and marginalized groups, and then 
justifying their actions by dissembling or relying on false or misleading factual 
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claims. (See Args.II, III.) As Justice Souter explained, the courts act as a vital 
check on the government’s penchant to “amplify” its claim of necessity to legally 
justify its actions: 
[f]or reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the 
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on 
which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance 
between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; 
the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that 
security legitimately raises. A reasonable balance is more likely to be 
reached on the judgment of a different branch [the Judiciary]. 
 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).  
These judicial checks, rooted in the constitutional separation of powers,2 are 
essential because “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it 
comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.” Id. at 536. As the Supreme Court 
affirmed in closely reviewing executive detention powers after the Civil War, the 
“safeguards of liberty” should receive the “watchful care of those [e]ntrusted with 
the guardianship of the Constitution and laws”—the courts. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 
124. More recently, during the Iraq War, Justice Kennedy reiterated that even in 
“extraordinary times…[l]iberty and security can be reconciled; and in our 
system…reconciled [by courts] within the framework of the law.” Boumediene, 
553 U.S. at 798; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.Supp.2d 527, 532 (E.D.Va. 2002) 
                                                 
2 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293-94 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“separation of 
powers was adopted…not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. 
The purpose was…to save the people from autocracy. …And protection of the individual…from 
the arbitrary or capricious exercise of power was then believed to be an essential of free 
government.”).   
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(quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (“The standard of 
judicial inquiry must also recognize that the ‘concept of ‘national defense’ cannot 
be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of [government] power designed 
to promote such a goal’”), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 
507 (2004).   
The appropriate “standard of judicial inquiry” is determined by a 
straightforward principle that balances the government’s need to advance security 
with the people’s constitutional civil liberties guarantee: 
Except as to actions under civilly-declared martial law, the standard of 
judicial review of government restrictions of civil liberties of 
Americans is not altered or attenuated by the government's contention 
that “military necessity” or “national security” justifies the challenged 
restrictions. In operation, this means that the standard of review of 
governmental action is to be determined according to the existing 
constitutional doctrine which focuses on the right restricted. 
 
Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited - Correcting the Injustice of 
Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better 
Accommodation of National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 Santa Clara 
L.Rev. 1, 41-42 (1986); Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law 805 (3d 
ed.2002) (addressing importance of heightened scrutiny “in cases like Hirabayashi 
and Korematsu, ‘where there is the most at stake in terms of personal freedom and 
the political branches are most likely to over-react’”). 
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Under established doctrine, the character of the “rights restricted” 
determines the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 529-30 (1945) (“the character of the right, not of the limitation…determines 
what standard governs the choice” of review); United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (actions “against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition…call[ing] for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry”); Aviam Soifer, Law and the Company We Keep 131-33 
(1995).   
Measures are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny—requiring the 
government to carefully delineate those targeted and demonstrate bona fide 
necessity—only when they appear to curtail fundamental liberties or involve 
suspect classifications like race. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory 
of Judicial Review 135-36 (1980). In those instances, keeping in mind the possible 
need for confidentiality, a court requires the government to forthrightly and 
substantially justify its actions curtailing fundamental liberties. If the government 
can do so, its actions are sustained; if it cannot, its actions are invalidated. Exacting 
judicial scrutiny thus affords the executive and legislative branches latitude in 
undertaking genuinely needed security measures that impinge upon basic liberties 
while also preventing (in the specific case) and deterring (in future instances) 
government overreaching or dissembling that damages foundational American 
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values. David Cole & James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: 
Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security 241 (rev. ed. 2006) 
(“We subject executive decisions to judicial review…because…the adversarial 
process can produce a fuller factual record, exposing faulty assumptions, and 
because deliberative review by life-tenured judges can protect against the rash 
decisions resulting from the pressures felt by elected officials.”).3  
Despite disagreements, courts now correctly recognize the necessity for 
meaningful judicial review even (or especially) in the national security context, in 
part because the internment cases demonstrated the grave danger of a hands-off 
judiciary. (See Arg.III.) Reflecting this trend, Judge Forrest’s decision properly 
rejected the government’s argument that judges should “step aside” in these 
                                                 
3 Justice Jackson’s Youngstown analysis of the nature of executive power under the Constitution 
is not contrary to amici’s view of the judiciary’s critical role in protecting our fundamental 
freedoms. While Jackson posited that Presidential authority is “at its maximum” when authorized 
by Congress, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring), this “rough” formulation, id. at 635, is, and must be, tempered by countervailing 
principles: that the purpose of the Constitutional diffusion of power is “to secure liberty,” id.; 
that the President and Congress must exercise their delegated powers within Constitutional 
limits, id. at 640; and that the nature of the “rights restricted” by governmental action, not of the 
power exercised, fixes the proper level of judicial scrutiny, see Thomas, 323 U.S. at 529-30. As 
the intellectual architect of the Nuremberg war crimes trials, Jackson understood the need for 
meaningful judicial review. Having dissented in Korematsu, Jackson would have understood that 
the Japanese American internment and coram nobis cases teach that the judiciary’s check on the 
political branches through its power of searching review must not be curtailed even when, in 
times of national distress, they act together in denying essential freedoms. 
 
Judge Forrest’s decision recognizes these principles: “It is simply not the case that by prefacing 
this statute with the provision ‘Congress affirms…the authority of the President…to detain 
covered persons…,’ it is outside of the purview of judicial review. If that were the case, it would 
reveal an extraordinary loophole through which the legislative and executive branches could 
create immunity from judicial oversight[.]” Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839 at *31. 
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controversies. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012). Citing the historical “embarrassment” of the deferential 
Korematsu majority, id. at *5, Judge Forrest instead carefully reviewed the 
government’s arguments and evidence on §1021(b)(2) and related issues of 
standing and injunctive relief in light of the NDAA’s curtailment of core liberties 
of speech and due process. (See Arg.IV.) In doing so she faithfully discharged the 
judiciary’s obligation of “watchful care.” 
II. HISTORY TEACHES THAT SEARCHING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
OF GOVERNMENT NATIONAL SECURITY RESTRICTIONS IS 
CRUCIAL TO PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES.   
 
History reveals that in times of national distress the government has too 
often reacted excessively and, “subtly renounc[ing] their role as constitutional 
backstop,” courts have deferred to the political branches, “taking a hands-off 
approach in reviewing government national security actions, even where 
fundamental liberties are sharply restricted." Eric K. Yamamoto & Susan K. 
Serrano, The Loaded Weapon, 27 Amerasia J. 51, 55 (2001). Justice Thurgood 
Marshall observed: 
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of 
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. 
The World War II relocation-camp cases, and the Red scare and 
McCarthy-era internal subversion cases, are only the most extreme 
reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed 
in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to 
regret it. 
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Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530 (“history and common sense” reveal “that an 
unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for 
oppression and abuse”).  
 For Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, who experienced first-hand the 
injustice resulting from a lack of searching judicial scrutiny, the courts’ history of 
failures to check excessive government actions is particularly relevant. Indeed, in 
an earlier amicus brief, Korematsu recounted the historical “pattern whereby the 
executive branch curtails civil liberties much more than necessary during wartime 
and seeks to insulate the basis for its actions from any judicial scrutiny,” including 
the following dark chapters in American law. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred 
Korematsu, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), 2004 WL 103832, at *2.   
 The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were early measures President Adams 
deployed to scapegoat political enemies under the guise of patriotism and national 
security. See Alien Friends Act, ch.58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Sedition Act of 1798, 
ch.73, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (both expired in 1800). With the judiciary's approval, 
United States v. Duane, 25 F.Cas. 917 (C.C.Pa. 1801) (No. 14,996); United States 
v. Cooper, 25 F.Cas. 631 (C.C.Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865), these Acts enabled the 
executive branch to stifle political dissent by detaining political dissenters as 
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“dangerous.” James Morton Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition 
Laws and American Civil Liberties (1956). 
 During World War I, under the Espionage Act of 1917 and a “feverish 
atmosphere,” the judiciary allowed the government to prosecute wartime dissenters 
for their protest speech. Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the 
Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U.Chi. L.Rev. 335, 357 (2003). 
Deferential courts affirmed many Espionage Act convictions. Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
The Cold War era’s McCarthyism and loyalty oaths destroyed many lives as 
the government prosecuted American Communist Party members and scapegoated 
alleged “sympathizers.” Tainted often with anti-Semitism and racial prejudice, and 
with deferential courts lending their imprimatur, the government trampled 
individuals’ constitutional rights of free speech and association under the mantle of 
national security. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) 
(upholding Smith Act prosecutions). 
This history and the Japanese American internment cases discussed below 
illuminate a key insight for the judiciary: when core constitutional liberties are at 
stake, courts need to subject government claims of national security necessity to 
heightened scrutiny to promote government accountability and foster democratic 
checks-and-balances.  
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III.   THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERNMENT DECISIONS 
ILLUSTRATE THE DANGERS OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO 
NATIONAL SECURITY RESTRICTIONS THAT CURTAIL 
FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES.  
 
 The Supreme Court’s Japanese American internment cases—particularly 
Korematsu—have been cited by judges and scholars to illustrate the need for 
careful judicial review during times of national distress.4 These cases, along with 
the evidence supporting their reopening in later coram nobis proceedings, illustrate 
two stark realities: 1) during time of fear or distress, both the executive and 
legislative branches at times bend to the will of “intemperate majorities,” Edward 
Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power 63 (1991), and 
unfairly target unpopular and relatively powerless groups; and 2) lax judicial 
review not only allows or even condones such governmental excess, but invites 
                                                 
4 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 375-76 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“[C]ourts must be vigilant in guarding Constitutional freedoms, perhaps 
never more so than in time of war. We must not forget the lesson of Korematsu[.]”); Fraise v. 
Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 530 (3d Cir. 2002) (Rendell, J., dissenting) (citing Korematsu, “[w]e 
have, at times, overreacted in response to perceived characteristics of groups thought to be 
dangerous to our security” and requiring “close scrutiny” to determine whether group 
membership poses a real threat); Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F.Supp.2d 379, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), 
affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded by John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d 
Cir. 2008), modified (Mar. 26, 2009) (citing Korematsu: “The pages of this nation’s 
jurisprudence cry out with compelling instances illustrating that…when the judiciary lowers its 
guard on the Constitution, it opens the door to far-reaching invasions of liberty."); Farag v. 
United States, 587 F.Supp.2d 436, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Korematsu is “now widely regarded as 
a black mark on our constitutional jurisprudence”); see also Eugene Rostow, The Japanese 
American Cases--A Disaster, 54 Yale L.J. 489, 502-33 (1945); Margaret Chon, Remembering 
and Repairing: The Error Before Us, In Our Presence, 8 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 643, 645 (2010); 
Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” of 
Arab Americans as “Terrorists,” 8 Asian L.J. 1, 12 (2001).  
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abuses of power, including in amici’s fathers’ cases a fraud on the courts at the 
highest levels.   
A. The Supreme Court’s failure to closely scrutinize the 
government’s claims of military necessity for the Japanese 
American internment led it to validate one of the most sweeping 
deprivations of fundamental liberties in American history. 
 
 Americans now know that the Japanese American internment was “not 
justified by military necessity”; instead, its “broad historical causes…were race 
prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.” U.S. Comm’n on 
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Congress of 1980, Report: 
Personal Justice Denied, at 18 (1982); see 50A U.S.C. §1989a(a). The Court’s 
failure to adequately scrutinize the government actions in amici’s father’s cases 
validated the notion of racial guilt, with its enduring human cost on the Japanese 
American community. 
 On February 19, 1942, bowing to political and media pressure, both 
exploiting and fueled by public fears, id. at 67-82; Roger Daniels, Concentration 
Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II 32-34 (1972), President 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, 7 Fed.Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942), which 
effectively gave the military sweeping authority over civilians in the name of 
national security. Congress made violation of military orders issued under EO 
9066 a federal offense. Pub.L.No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942). Using this 
authority, Lt. General John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, 
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issued orders imposing a curfew on all persons of Japanese ancestry and then 
forcibly removing them from their homes and communities. Without any proven 
acts of espionage or sabotage, over 110,000 Japanese Americans, two-thirds U.S. 
citizens, were interned in concentration camps in harshly desolate areas of the 
interior for the duration of the war. Daniels, supra, at 33, 104.  
Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu defied the military orders and 
challenged the constitutionality of their resulting criminal convictions, and thereby 
the internment as a whole, as racist deprivations of fundamental rights. Affirming, 
the Supreme Court failed to carefully scrutinize the basis for these orders, but 
instead, deferred to Lt.Gen. DeWitt’s ostensible judgment that military necessity 
compelled the government’s actions. 
 Hirabayashi initiated the Court’s troubling path of judicial abdication. After 
deciding to address only Hirabayashi’s curfew conviction, the Court explained 
that, in reviewing the actions of the war-making branches of government, “it is not 
for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or to substitute its 
judgment for theirs.” Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85, 93. Further, uncritically 
accepting the government’s calculated use of judicial notice, Nanette Dembitz, 
Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s 
Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 Colum. L.Rev. 175, 185-87 (1945), the Court 
failed to require bona fide proof of the government’s claims that the orders were 
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justified. The “facts” the government asserted and the Court adopted—that the 
proximity of Japanese Americans to strategic installations, their “racial 
characteristics,” and purported instances of espionage or sabotage created a “real” 
threat to national security, Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 95-98— were all controverted. 
Improperly taking judicial notice of these disputed “facts,” the Court accepted, 
without scrutinizing, the government’s claim of military necessity. Employing a 
double-negative, the Court announced that “we cannot reject as unfounded the 
judgment” of the military commander and political branches. Id. at 99. 
A year-and-a-half later, the Supreme Court decided Korematsu, upholding 
the constitutionality of the forcible removal of West Coast Japanese Americans. 
323 U.S. at 217-18. While the Court asserted that governmental racial 
classifications should be “subject...to the most rigid scrutiny,” the Court again 
deferred to the political branches and military, inquiring only whether there was 
any basis for disagreeing with the orders, not whether they were based on a 
“pressing public necessity,” and accepting carte blanche the government’s 
untrustworthy post hoc record, untested by the protections of the adversarial 
process. Id. at 216-19.  In Korematsu, the Court accepted DeWitt’s Final Report’s 
key factual statements, again, without scrutiny. Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(questioning credibility of DeWitt’s report). Ultimately, re-inscribing its highly 
deferential posture, the Court explained that, “Here, as in the Hirabayashi 
Case: 12-3176     Document: 137     Page: 23      12/17/2012      795402      38
16 
 
case…‘we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and 
of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number 
and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.’” Id. at 218. 
In separate dissents, three justices condemned the Court’s decision. Notably, 
Justice Jackson warned that the Court’s deferential stance posed a far-reaching and 
permanent danger: 
How does the Court know that these orders have a reasonable basis in 
necessity? No evidence whatever on that subject has been taken by 
this or any other court. There is sharp controversy as to the credibility 
of the DeWitt report. So the Court, having no real evidence before it, 
has no choice but to accept General DeWitt's own unsworn, self-
serving statement, untested by any cross-examination, that what he 
did was reasonable.   
 
Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). In deferring to the government’s claim of 
military necessity, he explained, the Court dangerously turned a factually untested 
military expedient into constitutional precedent–“a loaded weapon”: “the Court for 
all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure 
and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded 
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible 
claim of an urgent need.” Id. at 245-46 (emphasis added). 
 In short, in the internment cases, the Court abdicated its role as a check on 
the excessive exercise of government power, and, in so doing, gave the 
government’s racially-based actions the imprimatur of constitutional authority. 
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B. The coram nobis proceedings revealed that a deferential Supreme 
Court decided Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui based on a 
fraudulent evidentiary record, underscoring the importance of 
exacting judicial scrutiny.  
 
 For 40 years after their Supreme Court decisions, amici’s fathers continued 
to believe that the Court’s essential validation of the internment contravened the 
nation’s constitutional principles. Many came to view the internment as an 
egregious “mistake.” See Rostow, supra at 489 (calling the wartime internment 
“mistaken”); Proclamation No. 4417, 41 Fed.Reg. 7741 (Feb. 19, 1976) (President 
Ford rescinding EO 9066 and asking that country learn from our “mistakes”).  
 In 1981-1982, Peter Irons and Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga discovered WWII 
government records that proved the internment was not just a “mistake.” Instead, 
the government knew its claims that military necessity justified the internment 
were false, and deliberately suppressed, altered, and destroyed material evidence 
rebutting its claim of military necessity in order to secure favorable judicial rulings 
in the internment cases. Peter Irons, Justice at War 347-67 (1983).  
In 1983, based on these discoveries, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui 
filed petitions for writs of error coram nobis to vacate their wartime convictions, 
successfully proving in the two petitions heard on their merits that the 
government’s egregious misconduct not only denied them due process, but 
effectively validated the mass racial incarceration based on unfounded charges of 
treason. Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. 1406; Hirabayashi, 627 F.Supp.1445; 
Case: 12-3176     Document: 137     Page: 25      12/17/2012      795402      38
18 
 
Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d 591.5 The Supreme Court’s refusal to probe the 
government’s contentions, and its uncritical deference to DeWitt’s ostensible 
military judgment, particularly as expressed in his Final Report, enabled this 
pervasive fraud.  
First, as the government’s records proved, the Final Report submitted to the 
Supreme Court had been materially altered to fabricate an acceptable factual 
justification for the forced removal and internment. Hirabayashi, 627 F.Supp. at 
1456-57. A prior original Final Report, submitted to the War Department in April 
1943 while the DOJ was finalizing its Hirabayashi and Yasui briefs, made clear 
that DeWitt’s purported military decision had nothing to do with lack of time to 
identify potentially disloyal Japanese Americans—the government’s official 
rationale adopted by the Supreme Court.6 DeWitt’s decision was based instead on 
his view that Japanese Americans were inherently disloyal because of their “ties of 
race…and the strong bonds of common tradition, culture and customs…. It was not 
that there was insufficient time in which to make such a determination; …a 
                                                 
5 For an extensive examination of the Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Yasui coram nobis 
litigations, see Peter Irons, Justice Delayed: The Record of the Japanese American Internment 
Cases 3-46 (1989); Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights and Reparation: Law and the Japanese 
Internment 277-387 (2001). 
 
6 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24 (Korematsu “was excluded [from the Military 
Area]…because [the properly constituted military authorities] decided that the military urgency 
of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West 
Coast temporarily.... There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military 
authorities considered the need for action was great, and the time was short.”). 
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positive determination could not be made, [and] an exact separation of the ‘sheep 
from the goats’ was unfeasible.” Hirabayashi, 627 F.Supp. at 1449 (quoting 
DeWitt’s original Final Report). Alarmed, the War Department withheld the Final 
Report from the DOJ during Hirabayashi, forced DeWitt to change his report to 
recite the official “lack of time” rationale, ordered all copies of the original Final 
Report burned, and in Korematsu submitted the altered Final Report to the DOJ 
and Supreme Court as DeWitt’s military justification for his orders. Id. at 1450-51. 
Given this calculated fraud, the Supreme Court’s uncritical deference to the 
military commander’s purported judgment could not have been more prejudicial.  
Second, the coram nobis courts also found that the War Department and 
DOJ knowingly withheld from the Supreme Court critically reliable evidence 
rebutting DeWitt’s factual statements that Japanese Americans were involved in 
espionage and sabotage. The government suppressed a definitive report from the 
Office of Naval Intelligence, the agency charged with monitoring the Japanese 
American communities, which had found that Japanese Americans were 
overwhelmingly loyal to the U.S. and posed no security risk and that a mass 
incarceration was unnecessary. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 601. In April 1943, DOJ 
lawyer Edward Ennis strongly urged Solicitor General Charles Fahy to advise the 
Supreme Court in Hirabayashi and Yasui of the ONI report:   
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I think we should consider very carefully whether we do not have a 
duty to advise the Court of the existence of the Ringle memorandum 
and of the fact that his represents the view of the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. It occurs to me that any other course of conduct might 
approximate the suppression of evidence. 
 
Id. at 602 n.11 (emphasis added). The Solicitor General ignored Ennis’s warning, 
enabling the Court in the later Korematsu appeal to take judicial notice of 
purportedly uncontroverted “facts” that were actually sharply refuted. 
The DOJ similarly suppressed FBI and FCC records definitively discrediting 
the reports of Japanese American espionage and sabotage, including shore-to-ship 
signaling cited in DeWitt’s Final Report. Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1417; 
Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 603 n.12; Irons, Justice at War at 280-92. DOJ lawyer 
John Burling sought to disclaim reliance on the Final Report through a footnote in 
the government’s brief alerting the Supreme Court of the refutory intelligence 
reports, but at the War Department’s insistence, the disclaimer was watered down 
to virtual non-existence. Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1417-18; Hirabayashi, 828 
F.2d at 603 n.12. Ennis also unsuccessfully urged the Solicitor General to disclose 
the Final Report’s unreliability, charging that the ONI, FBI, and FCC reports 
showed that the allegations of Japanese American espionage and disloyalty were 
not just “untrue,” but were “lies, put out in an official publication” that could not 
be allowed to “go uncorrected.” In language prophetically underscoring the need 
for searching judicial review, Ennis warned: “If we fail to act forthrightly…, the 
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whole historical records of this matter will be as the military choose to state it.” 
Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1423.  
Lastly, although the Final Report had been thoroughly discredited, Solicitor 
General Fahy unequivocally warranted its reliability to the Supreme Court in oral 
argument, Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 600, stating: “not only the military judgment of 
the general, but the judgment of the Government of the United States, has always 
been in justification of the measures taken; and no person in any responsible 
position has ever taken a contrary position, and the Government does not do so 
now.” Transcript of Proceedings before the Supreme Court, Oct. 12, 1944, at 7, 
Korematsu v. United States Coram Nobis Litigation Collection Number 545, Box 
25, Folder 5, Dept. of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, 
UCLA (emphasis added). Astonishingly, in response to direct questioning, Fahy 
continued to unqualifiedly vouch for the Final Report’s reliability: “there is not a 
single line, a single word, or a single syllable in that report which in any way 
justifies the statement that General DeWitt did not believe he had, and did not 
have, a sufficient basis, in honesty and good faith, to believe that the measures 
which he took were required as a military necessity in protection of the West 
Coast,” and “[w]e say that the report proves the basis for the exclusion orders. 
There is not a line in it that can be taken in any other way. It is a complete 
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justification and explanation of the reasons which led to [DeWitt’s] judgment.” Id. 
at 6-7, 9-10.7   
The government’s fabrication of the record presented to the Supreme Court 
highlights the danger of uncritical judicial deference to government national 
security claims. As Judge Voorhees explained: “The central issue before the 
Supreme Court…was whether exclusion was in fact required by military necessity. 
Nothing would have been more important…than to know just why it was that 
General DeWitt made the decision that he did.” Hirabayashi, 627 F.Supp. at 1456. 
More generally, and quite relevant here, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel emphasized that 
all public institutions, including the judiciary, must vigilantly protect 
“constitutional guarantees,” especially during perceived crises:  
Korematsu remains on the pages of our legal and political history. As 
a legal precedent it is now recognized as having very limited 
application. As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution that 
in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be 
vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution 
that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national 
security must not be used to protect governmental actions from close 
scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a caution that in times of 
international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative, 
executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to 
protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that are so 
easily aroused.   
 
                                                 
7 Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal recently acknowledged the injustice of his predecessor’s 
failure to truthfully present these cases to the Supreme Court. Confession of Error: The Solicitor 
General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, The Justice Blog, 
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/ archives/1346 (May 20, 2011). 
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Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1420 (emphasis added).   
C. The lessons of the internment civil liberties “disaster” 
demonstrate the importance of heightened judicial scrutiny of 
government national security measures curtailing fundamental 
liberties. 
 
Amici ask this Court, and the judiciary as a whole, to recognize the lessons 
of history and the critical importance of the courts in carefully scrutinizing 
government national security claims to assure timely protection of constitutional 
liberties.  
 First, it is precisely during times of national stress that the government has 
too often targeted vulnerable individuals and groups, denying their fundamental 
rights and liberties. These measures are commonly "part of a much larger picture" 
of government and public oppression of unpopular and vulnerable groups.8 Undue 
judicial deference enables such injustice: “national security crises coupled with 
racism or nativism and backed by the force of law generate deep and lasting social 
injustice," damaging American democracy. Yamamoto & Serrano, supra at 57. 
 Second, even intelligent, educated, and well-intentioned decision-makers at 
times succumb to human frailties and the corrupting influences of power during 
times of national stress. Heated public emotion may cloud judgment, and, as the 
                                                 
8 Yamamoto, White (House) Lies, supra, at 327. See also Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, 
Walking While Muslim, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215, 238 (2005) (exploring “terror-
profiling”: “the selectively negative treatment…of individuals or groups thought to be associated 
with terrorist activity, based on race, ethnicity, national origin and/or religion”); Saito, 
Symbolism Under Siege, supra, at 12 (America has “raced” those of Arab ancestry as 
“‘terrorists’: foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening”). 
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coram nobis cases show, power exercised during a perceived crisis may invite its 
own abuse, leading some to dissemble or even fabricate justifications for actions 
taken. Many involved in the internment later regretted their actions. Former Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, who as California Attorney General vigorously advocated the 
removal of West Coast Japanese Americans, wrote: 
I have since deeply regretted the removal order and my own testimony 
advocating it, because it was not in keeping with our American 
concept of freedom and the rights of citizens.... It was wrong to react 
so impulsively, without positive evidence of disloyalty, even though 
we felt we had a good motive in the security of our state. It 
demonstrates the cruelty of war when fear, get-tough military 
psychology, propaganda, and racial antagonism combine with one's 
responsibility for public security to produce such acts. 
 
Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 149 (1977). 
 Finally, searching judicial review is critical where, as under the NDAA, 
military authorities are granted unfettered indefinite detention discretion. During 
WWII, President Roosevelt essentially issued the military a “blank check.” 
DeWitt’s orders based on this limitless grant, to which the Court uncritically 
deferred, culminated in the internment. In reviewing the NDAA’s new detention 
provision, the courts cannot afford to mimic the wartime Supreme Court’s failure. 
As the Court has recently confirmed: “Within the Constitution's separation-of-
powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary 
as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to 
imprison a person.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797.  
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Here, Judge Forrest correctly rejected the government’s suggestion that she 
uncritically defer to its claims. Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839 at *4, *28-33. By 
upholding Judge Forrest’s searching review of the government’s defense of the 
NDAA’s virtually limitless detention authority, this Court can affirm the 
importance of the judiciary’s independent check on governmental actions 
curtailing fundamental liberties in the name of national security.  
IV. JUDGE FORREST APPROPRIATELY DISCHARGED THE 
JUDICIARY’S OBLIGATION OF “WATCHFUL CARE.” 
 
Judge Forrest exactingly scrutinized §1021(b)(2), the government’s 
arguments, and the factual record, and, in so doing, properly discharged the 
judiciary’s role as an independent check on governmental restrictions of 
fundamental liberties.   
First, she correctly rejected the Government’s argument that she should 
“essentially ‘stay out of it,’—that is, exercise deference to the executive and 
legislative branches[.]” Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *4. While acknowledging 
that courts “owe the political branches a great deal of deference in the area of 
national security[,]” she recognized that where “core constitutional rights” are 
implicated, “[h]eedlessly to refuse to hear constitutional challenges to the 
Executive’s conduct in the name of deference would be to abdicate this Court’s 
responsibility to safeguard the rights it has sworn to uphold.” Id. Citing Korematsu 
to underscore the dangers flowing from improperly lax judicial oversight, Judge 
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Forrest explained: “Presented, as this Court is, with unavoidable constitutional 
questions, it declines to step aside.” Id. at *5.9 She also drew upon Justice Scalia’s 
affirmation of the importance of checks-and-balances, even during wartime: “The 
proposition that the Executive lacks indefinite wartime detention authority over 
citizens is consistent with the Founders' general mistrust of military power 
permanently at the Executive's disposal.” Id. at *20 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 
568 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  
 Second, Judge Forrest correctly rejected the government’s position that “the 
Court’s role should be limited to a post-detention habeas review.” Id. at *5. “The 
Government argues that the judiciary should play no role here—or, at most, an ex 
post facto one in which it reviews habeas petitions challenging detention 
determinations.” Id. at *28. Judge Forrest warned that innocent persons could be 
imprisoned for years if judicial review were limited to post-detention proceedings. 
Id. at *5, *31. That danger is real. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 285 (1944) (three 
years for Supreme Court to grant Endo’s habeas corpus challenge to her 
                                                 
9 Justice Murphy’s and Justice Jackson’s dissents also provided guidance to Judge Forrest’s 
exacting scrutiny: “In Justice Murphy's Korematsu dissent, he reiterated the principle that 
‘[w]hat are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been 
overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.’ Justice Jackson also dissented in 
Korematsu, stating, ‘I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to enforce an order which 
violates constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable exercise of military authority. The 
courts can exercise only the judicial power, can apply only law, and must abide by the 
Constitution, or they cease to be civil courts and become instruments of military policy.’” 
Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *33.  
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internment). As Judge Forrest explained, “[a]ny period of detention (let alone 
years) for what could be an unconstitutional exercise of authority, finds no basis in 
the Constitution.” Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *31. 
Third, Judge Forrest appropriately subjected §1021(b)(2) to heightened 
scrutiny because it impinges on the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to free speech 
and due process. Id. at *35. She emphasized that the court must subject a national 
security measure treading on these rights to “exacting scrutiny and ask whether it is 
‘actually necessary’ to achieve those interests.” Id. at *38 (quoting United States v. 
Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012)). Discharging the court’s obligation of 
“watchful care,” Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124, Judge Forrest refused to blindly accept 
the government’s arguments and instead closely interrogated the basis for the 
government action. See, e.g., Hedges, 2012 WL 399839, at *27 (“Simply by 
asserting that §1021 is a reaffirmation of the AUMF does not make it so.”).   
 Thus, rather than simply accepting the government’s unsupported claim that 
plaintiffs lacked standing, Judge Forrest searched for evidentiary support for the 
claim that they had no reasonable fear that their actions would subject them to 
detention. Id. at *12-13. However, “[t]he Government did not submit any evidence 
in support of its positions.” Id. at *6. The government, she explained, could have 
offered evidence, if available, that no one had been detained for engaging in First 
Amendment activities, as well as evidence on how enforcement decisions were 
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made under §1021(b)(2), including how the phrases “substantial support,” “direct 
support,” and “associated forces” were interpreted. Id. at *12. The court, however, 
would neither assume what the “Government’s evidence would have been,” nor 
accept its “ipse dixit that plaintiffs’ fears of detention were unreasonable.” Id. at 
*12-13. Nor could Judge Forrest accept the government’s mere promise that 
plaintiffs would not be subject to indefinite detention. Id. at *28, *36.  
 Similarly, Judge Forrest probed the language of §1021(b)(2), pressing for 
the practical meaning and application of key terms, including “associated forces,” 
“substantially supported,” and “directly supported,” but the Government was 
unable to define these terms. Id. at *2, *26, *43. When pressed on whether 
plaintiffs could be detained under §1021(b)(2), the government first could not say 
whether plaintiffs were subject to detention, id. at *36, and later stated that they 
would not be if certain criteria were met, id. at *1, *2-3, *11, *27. These 
responses, Judge Forrest concluded, were insufficient; neither provided assurance 
that the statute would not penalize First Amendment activities. Id. at *1, *28.  
Finally, Judge Forrest correctly concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to 
injunctive relief, explaining that the due deference the courts must give the 
political branches on national security matters did not relieve the judicial 
obligation to determine whether §1021(b)(2) unconstitutionally violated plaintiffs’ 
rights. Id. at *5. In granting injunctive relief, she therefore declined to defer to the 
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government’s argument that plaintiffs faced no imminent threat of detention 
because it said so. Id. at *12.   
CONCLUSION 
 Amici respectfully urge this court to affirm Judge Forrest’s exacting scrutiny 
and ultimate permanent injunction.  Through this heightened review, Judge Forrest 
wisely heeded the lessons of history and correctly discharged the judiciary’s 
constitutional duty of “watchful care.”   
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